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Abstract—Self driving cars have recently attracted academia
and industry interest. As planning algorithms become respon-
sible for critical decisions, many questions concerning traffic
safety arise. An increased automation level demands proportional
impact on safety requirements, currently governed by the ISO
26262 standard. However, ISO 26262 sees safety as a functional
property of a system and fails to cover emergent concerns related
to autonomous decisions. In order to fill this gap we propose the
field of tactical safety, which extends safety analysis to planning
and execution of driving maneuvers, response to traffic events or
autonomous system failures. It is meant to complement, not to
replace functional safety properties of a system and allows the
analysis of autonomous agents from a safe behavior point of view.
We draw the requirements for tactical safety from an automotive
standard which defines functional elements for advanced driving
automation systems.
Index Terms—Autonomous vehicles, Vehicle safety, Advanced
driver assistance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous driving is the leading innovation factor in
today’s automotive industry. New software driven companies
compete with vehicle manufacturers to raise the level of
driving automation. The process is often regarded as adding a
layer of cognitive intelligence on top of basic vehicle platforms
[1]. In this sense, software is the main innovation driver,
as traditional mechanic and hardware components become a
commodity [2].
Recent innovation trends promise to increase passenger’s
safety and traffic efficiency by minimizing human involvement
and error. The transfer of total control from humans to
machines is classified by the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) as a stepwise process on a scale from 0 to 5, where 0
involves no automation and 5 means full-time performance by
an automated driving system of all driving aspects, under all
roadway and environmental conditions [3].
As the amount of software grows, there is a need to use
more advanced software engineering methods and tools to
handle its complexity, size and criticality [4]. An increased
automation level demands proportional impact on safety re-
quirements, governed by the mandatory compliance to ISO
26262 [5]. However, current safety policies fail to define and
represent new concerns related to autonomous decisions. Few
researchers have exposed the challenges autonomous vehicles
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face as we transfer more and more control from humans to
machines [6, 7, 8].
Nonetheless, it is not yet known how to reason about safe
behavior of autonomous vehicles. To this end, we introduce
tactical safety. Moreover, we seek to uncover tactical safety
requirements from the SAE J3016 standard [3] and position
them in a research context. SAE J3016 defines multiple levels
of driving automation and includes functional definitions for
each level.
In the following section we provide background information
about the ISO 26262 automotive safety standard and the SAE
J3016 classification of driving automation. The third section
outlines a definition for tactical safety. Later, in Section IV,
we follow the SAE classification in order to discover tactical
safety requirements and challenges. These spread over a num-
ber of research fields discussed in Section V. We conclude
and present future research in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
Safety concerns, as stipulated by the compliance to ISO
26262, consist of the identification and management of haz-
ards. In general, hazards are caused by failures. In contrast
to failures in physical devices, which can occur randomly,
software failures are due to design faults [9]. Therefore, in
software systems, safety is achieved by avoiding or protecting
against such faults.
The ISO 26262 standard provides an automotive-specific
risk management framework for determining risk classes:
Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL). The ASIL defini-
tion replaces the concept of Likelihood from the safety risk
definition (equation 1) [10] with Controllability (equation 2),
thus enforcing how well a potential failure can be managed
inside the system and not how likely it is to occur.
Risk = Severity × (Exposure× Likelihood) (1)
Risk = Severity × (Exposure× Controllability) (2)
ISO 26262 sees safety as a functional property of a system
and enforces safe operation in response to inputs, hardware
failures or environmental changes.
The SAE J3016 classification of driving automation for on-
road vehicles, shown in Figure 1, is meant to clarify the role
of the human driver, if any, during vehicle operation. It uses
as first discriminant the environmental monitoring agent. In
the case of partial or no automation (levels 0-2), a human
driver is responsible to perceive the environment, while for
higher degrees of automation (levels 3-5), the vehicle is held
responsible for this task.
The more significant criteria for this paper is the responsibil-
ity for fall-back performance mechanisms. Intelligent driving
systems (level 4 and 5) take full responsibility for traffic safety
and fault management, while less automated vehicles (levels
1-3) require a human driver to take control in case of any fault.
Fig. 1: SAE J3016 levels of driving automation [3].
According to SAE:
• if the driving automation system performs the entire
Dynamic Driving Task (DDT), but a DDT
fall-back ready user is expected to take over when a sys-
tem failure occurs, then the division of roles corresponds
to the 3rd level.
• if a driving automation system can perform the entire
DDT and all fall-back mechanisms in limited or unlimited
Operational Design Domain (ODD)s, then the division of
roles corresponds to levels 4 and 5.
Moreover, the SAE J3016 definition for DDT outlines a list
of functional components that need to be automated in order
to reach level 3:
• operational functions - basic vehicle control,
• tactical functions - planning and execution for
event/object avoidance and expedited route following,
• strategic functions - destination and general route plan-
ning.
The ISO 26262 standard provides a way to manage func-
tional safety throughout the system, spanning all automation
levels. However, up to this moment, few researchers have
addressed the problem of safe autonomous behavior. This
corresponds to tactical functions of the DDT and the DDT
fall-back mechanisms. Strategic functions have no impact on
traffic safety because they only handle destination and general
route planning. This impacts the general travel time, but not
the traffic participant’s safety.
III. TACTICAL SAFETY
ISO 26262 sees safety as a functional property of a system
and divides safety responsibilities between (a) drivers and (b)
vehicle manufacturers. The former (a) assumes blame in case
of a crash due to a human driving error, while the latter (b) is
liable in case of a system failure (e.g. braking system stopped
working).
As the level of automation increases, the responsibility for
driving errors moves from drivers (a) to vehicles and vehicle
manufacturers (b). This means that a vehicle becomes respon-
sible for driving decisions. While all functional components
that implement driving decisions have to operate safely, in
conformance to ISO 26262, there is no framework to describe
and reason about safe, autonomous, decisions. In this context
we define tactical safety as a branch of autonomous vehicle
safety concerned with the safe planning and execution of
driving maneuvers and response to traffic events or DDT fails.
Tactical safety is meant to complement functional safety and
not to replace it.
Safety concerns of autonomous vehicles can be classified as:
• functional safety concerns - safe operation of a system
in response to inputs, hardware failures or environmental
changes and
• tactical safety concerns - safe planning and execution of
driving maneuvers and response to driving events or DDT
faults.
IV. FUNCTIONAL AND TACTICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
IN SAE J3016 CONTEXT
Our definition of tactical safety covers safe planning and
execution of driving maneuvers and response to traffic events
when reaching a destination (1) and in response to DDT fails
(2). Starting with level 0, vehicle manufacturers can deploy
safety features that respond to traffic events such as emergency
brake or lane departure warning. However, these are not fully
responsible for either (1) or (2). In literature, such components
are called reactive safety components and operate with a high
frequency to provide minimal response to traffic. Nevertheless,
they are not covered by tactical safety.
Starting with SAE level 3, a vehicle is fully responsible
for (1), in the presence of a human driver, which takes
responsibility for (2). A definition for (1) is not specified in
the SAE J3016. However, it is implicit that no action of a
vehicle can lead to a crash. Moreover, a vehicle should avoid
or minimize a crash or casualties in response to other traffic
participants or events. Safety components that implement (1)
are known in literature as executive safety components and
operate at lower frequencies, constrained by the processing
time. However, they are able to generate and execute complex
trajectories in response to traffic events.
Figure 2 illustrates traffic situations which call for distinct
safety behavior. In the first case, 2a, the blue vehicle can use
a reactive component such as emergency braking to avoid a
crash. In the second case, 2b, the blue vehicle can either use
a reactive component or an executive component which plans
and executes an over-take. However, in case 2c, the only way
to avoid a crash is by choosing an avoidance trajectory, through
an executive component. Finding a good balance between the
two classes of components is a challenge automotive manu-
facturers face as more control and responsibility is transfered
to vehicles.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2: Traffic situation examples.
An exhaustive, formal, definition of all traffic events and
vehicle behavior is not feasible. Therefore, starting with level
3, a vehicle must reason about safety when planning driving
maneuvers or in response to traffic events. Through reasoning,
a series of future states are generated and implemented in
order to satisfy an objective. Following the assumptions made
earlier, the safety objective is to plan no action that leads
to a crash and avoid/minimize the risk of a crash/casualties
in response to traffic events (e.g. 2c). Safety objectives have
continuous properties. A vehicle must plan to avoid or generate
a crash in far future states, even though for immediate states
the safety objectives are satisfied.
Given the vast ecosystem of vehicle manufacturers, it is a
challenge to standardize both behavior and safety objectives.
Moreover, vehicle behavior must be verified and validated
before release. Future tactical safety standards for level 3 and
above must define hand crafted rules or driving policies that
can divide safety responsibility and assure liability. Moreover,
formal tools for verification and validation are needed. As for
the moment, no standardized set of requirements is articulated
for safe vehicle behavior.
Even though, at level 3, an active driver assumes DDT fall-
back responsibility (2), the decision to transfer the control
from a vehicle to a user belongs to the automated system.
This raises both functional and tactical safety challenges. At
first, from a functional perspective, the system must identify
a hazard that prevents normal operation. Secondly, the time
needed to transfer the control from an automated driving
system to a fall-back ready user has a big impact on traffic
safety. A complete definition for this interval includes the time
needed to detect a DDT fall-back condition, the time needed to
transfer the control and the driver’s response time. Moreover,
the user needs time to assess the situation and gather enough
data to take a decision. This is often regarded as an irony of
automation [11].
Consider an automated highway driving system capable to
maintain a constant speed, its lane boundaries and a distance
from the vehicle in front. While engaged, this system requires
a fall-back ready user. Traveling at 100 km/h, the vehicle
faces a road segment which poses problems for the automated
system (or the failure of a sensor) and requests the driver to
take control. Given the speed and the average visual response
time of a human (400 ms [12]), the vehicle will travel ≈ 11m
until a fall-back ready user will answer to a visual signal to
intervene (in theory). If we assume the user has to brake and it
starts breaking in ≈ 1s (400ms to visually respond and 600ms
to move the leg and push the breaking pedal), the vehicle
will travel ≈ 28m before starting to break. In such cases, if
an accident occurs, the blame/failure responsibility must be
clearly divided between the driver and the system.
Starting with level 3 environmental monitoring is an intrin-
sic component of tactical safety, as an automated vehicle is
fully responsible for this task. Environmental monitoring in-
volves the acquisition and processing of huge amounts of data
by advanced algorithms. Some of which are difficult to grasp.
For example, neural networks image recognition algorithms
are known to be error prone and difficult to understand [13].
The use of such algorithms raises serious challenges for traffic
safety. Recent research shows that a change in only one pixel
of an image can cause miss-classification errors [14, 15, 16].
Such perturbations may occur from malfunctioning sensors,
sensor wear or malicious attackers. In order to ensure safe
environmental monitoring, transparent, resilient to errors or
formally provable algorithms must be used to interpret data
coming from sensors. Sensor wear of malfunctioning is con-
sidered a hazard and belongs to functional safety requirements.
Only beginning with level 4 a vehicle is responsible for
both (1) and (2), constrained by operational domain limits. For
example, a vehicle can operate fully autonomously in limited
urban areas and clear weather. Following the SAE J3016
definition of DDT fall-back, an automated driving system is
responsible to bring the vehicle to a minimal risk condition
and reduce the risk of a crash, when a fall-back intervention is
needed. This extends the reasoning requirements from level 3
with DDT fall-back reasoning. The latter is meant to generate
a minimum risk condition and execute necessary steps in
order to reach it, while minimizing the risk of a crash. The
SAE definition for DDT fall-back holds when a crash can
be avoided, however, traffic situations are known to be much
more complex. In cases where a minimal risk condition can
not be reached or a crash can not be avoided, a vehicle must
still perform maneuvers which impact general traffic safety.
Objectives similar to ones introduced for level 3 vehicles must
be defined for DDT fall-back reasoning.
Level 4 vehicles have limited operational domains. For
example, a vehicle can operate in autonomous mode in a
limited urban area, in daylight conditions. In contrast, level
5 vehicles have no restrictions. They must drive safely under
all roadway and environmental conditions in which a human
can drive. This requirement adds two dimensions to the safety
reasoning concerns, expressed earlier:
• road constraints - the vehicle must be prepared to operate
safety or reach a minimum risk state in all known and
unknown road conditions (e.g. when a vehicle enters
a road segment for which no mapping information is
available).
• environmental constraints - the environmental constraints
are strongly related to weather conditions, but not limited.
While level 4 vehicles are bounded to limited domains, a
level 5 vehicle must operate in (all) evolving weather and
traffic conditions. For example, in conditions of sudden
snow or unforeseen traffic conditions such as special
cargoes.
Both sets of constraints impact tactical safety requirements.
Where a level 4 vehicle facing an operational domain outside
its bounds could cease operation, a level 5 vehicle must
continue to operate safely. The impact targets both hardware
(enhanced sensors are needed to satisfy all environmental and
road conditions) and software components through extended
reasoning capacity. For example, in traffic situation 2b and
heavy rain conditions, the vehicle might decide to break
instead of an over-take, because of low confidence in the way
it perceives the environment.
Tactical safety requirements evolve from level 4 to level 5
through enhanced context awareness. The reasoning process
for both (1) and (2) must include contextual information and
must perform under uncertainty. For example, if the vehicle
faces a road section for which no mapping information is
available, it must continue operation towards destination or
a minimal risk condition. These requirements directly impact
functional safety concerns, as an enhanced ability to perceive
the environment requires new functional components and
sensor fusion techniques.
We summarize the tactical and functional safety require-
ments in Figure 3. The table follows an incremental structure,
similar to the SAE J3016 classification of driving automation.
All requirements from a lower level of automation are manda-
tory for higher levels.
V. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
The early introduction of ISO 26262 allowed the develop-
ment of tools and methods that support standard compliance
[17, 18, 19]. Nevertheless, functional safety has a tangible
character and relies on mechanisms for error identification and
redundancy assurance. Recent developments in level 4 vehicles
[20] show that full system replication is a reliable method to
deal with functional safety concerns of autonomous vehicles.
Tactical safety, however, is less tangible. While it is not
a requirement for machine learning algorithms to handle
behavior planning or environmental monitoring, they appear as
SAE
Level
Functional Requirements Tactical requirements
3 Runtime hazardidentification & mitigation
Error resilient algorithms for
environmental monitoring;
Standard safety objectives;
Methods to prove correct safety
reasoning in limited ODDs;
Decision to transfer control;
Standard & provable transfer time;
4 Runtime hazardidentification & mitigation
DDT fall-back reasoning;
Standard DDT fall-back objectives;
Methods to prove correct DDT
fall-back reasoning;
5 Runtime hazardidentification & mitigation
Enhanced context awareness;
Advanced methods to prove correct
safety reasoning in all contexts;
Fig. 3: Safety requirements given the SAE classification of
driving automation for on-road vehicles.
the first industrial and research choice. Recent announcements
for level 4 vehicles [20], releases of driving simulators where
algorithms can learn to drive [21, 22, 23] or the efficiency
of such algorithms on complex tasks prove their precedence.
A safe learning process recently raised community attention.
Amodei et al. [24] are the first authors to compile a catalog of
safety problems learning algorithms face. While the work is
not automotive specific, it reveals important information about
an incipient research field. Leike et al. [25] developed a sim-
ulation environment where some of the problems introduced
in [24] can be mitigated and tested.
Shalev et al. [26] are the firsts to introduce a formalism for
safe and scalable self driving vehicles, through the conceptual-
ization of blame. In their model, a vehicle must learn to avoid
blame when executing driving maneuvers, thus minimizing
accident responsibility. Given the example in 2c, a vehicle
is not responsible for the accident, thus it can take no action.
Earlier, Shalev et al. [27] introduced a multi-agent learning
framework for autonomous driving, arguing that in order to
achieve safe autonomous driving, autonomous vehicles must
learn to cooperate and work together.
Safety of artificial intelligent systems receives increasing
attention because of their potential effects in safety-critical
systems such as autonomous vehicles [28]. The trouble with
image classification tasks, which play a crucial role in percep-
tion modules of autonomous vehicles, is that they do not have
a formal specification [29]. Recent results [29, 30, 31] pave
the road to formal verification of neural networks and increase
their resilience to errors or attacks. However, the performance
and scalability of such methods is still to evolve.
Concerned with functional safety of autonomous vehicles,
Gleirscher et al. [32, 33] introduced a formalism which allows
autonomous vehicles to define and reach safe states. Through
this formalism, an intelligent algorithm can reason about the
impact of a hazard on the vehicle planning ability and how a
safe state can be reached. Moreover, the authors introduced a
framework for the analysis and design of high level controllers
capable of run-time hazard identification and mitigation [34].
Their work targets the behavior of an automated vehicle in
case an of an internal hazard (e.g. loss of sensors).
Despite interest in safe behavior planning, the solution
domain lacks maturity. Works such as [26] open the road
for safe, autonomous vehicles. We argue that, similar to
functional safety, governed by the ISO 26262 standard, the
reasoning framework for safe, autonomous driving, must strive
for standardization. Driving policies must determine if blame,
casualties or property damage are good constraints for plan-
ning algorithms.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We have outlined an exploration of safety concerns of future
autonomous vehicles. We start by introducing the current au-
tomotive safety standard, ISO 26262, and the requirements for
automated vehicles, as specified in the SAE J3016 standard.
ISO 26262 sees safety as a functional property of a system
and fails to cover emergent concerns related to autonomous
decisions. In order to fill this gap, we propose the field of
tactical safety, which covers safe planning and execution of
driving maneuvers, response to traffic events or autonomous
system failures. It is meant to complement and not replace
the functional properties of a system. Moreover, it allows the
analysis of autonomous agents from a safety behavior point
of view.
We use the SAE J3016 standard to develop a set of
tactical safety requirements and future challenges, presented in
Figure 3. Few researchers have addressed the problem of safe
behavior planning. While not standard, learning algorithms
are the industry adopted method for trajectory planning. With
little literature support, their impact on traffic safety is often
overlooked.
This study is the first step towards a safety analysis of
autonomous vehicles behavior. For future work we propose
the development of a full reasoning framework around tactical
safety that can resemble the ISO 26262 body for functional
safety. In order to verify and validate tactical safety of fu-
ture intelligent vehicles, formal tools and methods must be
developed. While the final requirements are in the hands of
international standard-setting bodies, we are interested in the
development, verification and validation of safe behavior for
autonomous vehicles.
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